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Abstract 
Smartphones and other highly mobile yet sophisticated technologies are rapidly spreading through society and 
increasingly finding their way into pockets and handbags. As reliance upon these intensifies and familiarity 
grows, human nature dictates that more and more personal details and information is now to be found upon such 
devices. The need to secure and protect this valuable and desirable information is becoming ever more prevalent. 
Building upon previous work which proposed a novel approach to user authentication, an Authentication Aura, 
this paper investigates the latent security potential contained in surrounding devices in everyday life.  An 
experiment has been undertaken to ascertain the technological infrastructure, devices and inert objects that 
surround individuals to establish if these items might be significant. The results suggest that inert possessions 
may offer a surprisingly large potential with some being in close proximity to experimental subjects for over 45% 
of the entire period. With other graphical analysis illustrating the consistency of presence, this work suggests that 
everyday possessions and devices can be leveraged to augment traditional approaches and even in certain 
circumstances, during device activation remove the need to authenticate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As modern communication technology permeates ever further throughout society, the desire to remain in 
constant contact with colleagues, friends and family is increasingly met. The recent surge in sales of smart 
phones and other sophisticated mobile devices has driven a correlated explosion in Wi-Fi hotspot usage (In-stat, 
2009; In-stat, 2011). Technological boundaries are stretching and the devices people carry are evolving with 
expanding storage capabilities and processing power, enabling the porting of greater amounts of information and 
personal details. As this becomes the norm for us all, these personal items become an ever-increasing target for 
theft (CPP, 2010; Home Office, 2009).  In this climate, the requirement to protect and secure the potentially 
large volumes of sensitive and personal information contained within these desirable pieces of equipment is 
imperative and even acknowledged and supported by Government (Design Council, 2010; Rohde, 2001). 
Authentication of the user’s identity by any device provides the first line of defence in the battle to maintain data 
integrity following theft or loss. Establishing as far as possible that the operator is whom they purport to be, 
provides a device with the necessary degree of confidence to allow access and service utilisation. However, 
although steps have been taken to ensure the devices are only accessed by accredited individuals, the ubiquitous 
point of entry user identity code and password has been rendered susceptible to abuse through the inability or 
unwillingness of individuals to protect and administer this sensitive information correctly (Albrechtsen, 2007; 
Clarke and Furnell, 2005). In the event that several devices are carried simultaneously, the repeated intrusive 
accreditation process becomes laborious and inconvenient. Improving and evolving the employed authentication 
mechanism will go some way to counteract this burden and potentially provide an opportunity to increase the 
confidence in user identity. If a user has previously authenticated upon a device, why not use that confidence to 
provide automated access to other devices within a close proximity? Alternatively, authentication judgements 
made across several devices could also be used to deliver a collective confidence level – increasing the level of 
identity confidence that any one device could provide. Authentication Aura proposes to enable this distributed 
and collaborative environment that seeks to improve the level of authentication security and minimise user 
inconvenience. 
With intelligent gadgets, technical infrastructure, possessions and other factors playing such a pivotal role in the 
Authentication Aura’s operation it is vital to establish the viability of such an approach. Experiments have been 
carried out to assess the latent potential the presence of the electronic devices and currently dumb objects offer 
by assessing the amount of time individuals spend within detectable range of these pervasive items.  
The following two sections further outline the Authentication Aura concept and then proceed to detail the 
experiment which has been undertaken. This is then succeeded by an analysis of the experimental findings, 
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exploring the manner in which identity confidence could be influenced and how it could be utilised to calculate a 
new and reactive status. A summary of the paper’s findings are then outlined in a conclusion. 
BACKGROUND 
With the accepted fragility of the ubiquitous point of entry user identity and password authentication, research 
has been widespread in attempting to improve upon this current situation (O’ Gorman, 2003; Vu et al., 2007). 
One tranche of work, the Authentication Aura, suggested a distributed approach in which trusted and known 
devices that had all performed unilateral authentication, shared information between one another to bolster 
confidence in their own user’s identity (Hocking et al., 2010). This section briefly outlines the concept of the 
Aura, enabling the reader to gain an understanding of the motivation behind the current research. 
As an individual authenticates with a personal device, the piece of equipment establishes a confidence in the 
user’s identity. In most scenarios this is Boolean, the user is either whom they claim to be (they pass the 
authentication process) or they are not (they fail); thus the confidence is set at either complete (100%) and access 
is granted or it is none and the user is barred. The Authentication Aura suggests the use of confidence erosion 
following validated access which can in turn be utilised to reduce the availability of device functionality. High 
confidence will permit the use of expensive applications and access to sensitive data, whilst reduced confidence 
will block the use of these functions. Then when confidence erodes to a suitably low level, re-authentication of 
the user will be necessary to ensure continuing availability of use. 
Desktop
computer
Mobile
telephone
PDA
Laptop
computer
Password Fingerprint scan
Handwriting
match
Voice
recognition
iPad
Face
recognition
 
Figure 1.The potential intra-device relationship and authentication techniques (Hocking et al., 2010) 
To counteract this one-way-street, information pertaining to location, time since and method of authentication 
can be communicated between trusted devices; the Authentication Aura utilises each set of these conveyed 
details and other detected possessions to calculate a positive confidence contribution, slowing the degradation 
process. Figure 1 shows an example of how the information might be relayed amongst a group of commonly 
owned devices. 
For some intelligent devices it might be possible to undertake continuous authentication (such as voice 
recognition during telephone calls) to provide frequently reconfirmed identity details and a valuable confidence 
contribution, whilst others might simply act as tokens, their presence the only information of use. Figure 2 
summarises this. 
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Figure 2. Varying levels of device sophistication and consequent contribution to the authentication process 
If the Authentication Aura is successfully implemented, there is even the potential to achieve device activation 
without the need for authentication. For instance, if a user with a number of present and active devices proceeds 
to switch on another item of equipment, there might be sufficient relayed confidence available to make the newly 
activated item content to permit access immediately without additional intervention. With users currently 
performing many authentications during a day, any savings that can be gleaned must intuitively be of benefit. 
EXPERIMENT 
Motivation and approach 
The concept of an Authentication Aura relies on the intercommunication of information between intelligent 
devices supplemented by the detection of inert household or personal items (Hocking et al., 2010). To initially 
gauge the viability of this concept it is imperative that a data gathering exercise be undertaken to ascertain what 
devices are present within a short distance of an experimental participant at various points in time. This 
information can then be analysed to determine if there is a latent potential in surrounding devices that can be 
leveraged to augment traditional security. 
It would have been relatively straightforward to execute such a task on entirely intelligent devices however the 
premise dictates that both dumb objects and those that might be intelligent in the future (such as household white 
goods), are also included. An obvious solution would be to provide experimental subjects with pen and paper to 
record devices and items that surround them at any given moment, over a period of days. Intuitively this is far 
from practical. Forgetfulness and sheer imposition renders this an inappropriate approach; an alternative means 
of surveying an individuals surrounding locale needed to be found.  
With the requirement to include dumb and currently incapable devices, the selected method by which the 
appropriate information could be identified and recorded uses radio frequency identity (RFID) tags and 
associated sensing equipment. Each tag transmits a unique identification marker continuously across a short 
distance. By positioning a number of these on or near individual devices and objects of interest, it is possible for 
a small portable lightweight RFID reader to be constantly carried by a subject, allowing all detected tags to be 
recorded at discrete time intervals. This is of suitable imposition to ensure experimental volunteers were 
forthcoming. 
Details 
To facilitate the experiment equipment was purchased to enable the recording of data simultaneously for five 
subjects. Although in an ideal world as many candidates as possible would undertake the experiment at any one 
time, the prohibitive cost of equipment restricted the sample groups to five, an affordable number that would 
yield a meaningful set of results. The PDA RFID readers were Dell Axim x51s, each equipped with 
CompactFlash RFID nodes, capable of reading both passive and active RFID tags. Passive tags transmit their 
identity in response to a polled request from the reader inducing their power from the received signal; active tags 
however contain their own independent power supply in the form of a battery. Although active tags are much 
more expensive to buy their main advantage is that they can be detected over a far greater range, 10-15m in clear 
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line-of-sight, opposed to a maximum of 0.5m for the passive tags. Wi-Fi network infrastructure can provide 
connections over a wide area and so with the need to emulate this, the experiment requires detection of tags 
across several metres and through walls; it was therefore deemed prudent to spend the extra resource and secure 
the active variety. As such, seventy-five active tags were purchased enabling each individual volunteer to be 
supplied with fifteen, permitting them to identify and record a sufficient number of devices both at home and in 
their workspace. 
Table 1. Suggested locations for the RFID tags 
 
Mobile phone Work PC Home PC/Laptop Work Wi-Fi point 
Home Wi-Fi Point TV (s) Car interior Car keys 
Wallet/purse mp3 player Work bag/briefcase Home telephone 
Bedside clock Fridge Hi-Fi Coat pocket 
Groups of volunteers that worked together were picked to ensure there was a degree of crossover within their 
daytime activity allowing each subject’s recording equipment to detect other participant’s tags. In a functioning 
Aura environment additional security could be engendered from familiar devices belonging to friends or 
colleagues even though they are not specifically owned by the same user. Selecting groups in this way would 
provide a dimension to the results data that could be analysed to assess this premise.  
Each group of five subjects was instructed to undertake the experiment for fourteen days continuously, carrying 
the PDA with them at all times whilst ensuring that it remained charged and active. Software was written and 
deployed to the PDAs which recorded all detectable tag identities within range, their signal strength and time 
stamp, at one minute intervals. The individual’s tags were placed upon or attached to items of interest 
representing intelligent and dumb devices, personal possessions and infrastructure. A cross-reference list of tag 
identities and locations was recorded, enabling the identification of relevant items during later analysis..  
Initial observations 
Upon removing the data files and commencing analysis some initial observations have been made. With 
observations occurring each and every minute, twenty four hours a day, seven days a week the data set is 
intuitively large. For each of the participants the experiment yields 1,440 sets of readings each day which 
equates to 10,080 in total across a single week.  
 
Figure 3. A typical user's weekday observations 
Figure 3 illustrates the number of unique devices observed by an individual during a working week (Monday-
Friday). Each day is plotted as a separate set of readings with individual data points representing the average 
number of detected devices within a fifteen minute period plotted against the time of day that the observation 
was made. 
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Figure 4. The same typical user's weekend observations 
The weekday plot exhibits a maximum average of ten devices being detected in any given fifteen minute slot 
whilst at the weekend this figure peaks at twelve, suggesting that more static tags were located at home rather 
than at work. However, with such a high number of observations being recorded at both home and work it is 
apparent that the majority of tags were placed on portable possessions that the subject carried with them 
throughout the day. During the workdays there appears a high degree of variation in the number of observed 
devices implying that this subject is active during their employment and even spends time out of the office. Time 
away from their usual location can be perceived from the data on Tuesday and Thursday between 10a.m. and 
4p.m. where the average falls to a single unit. 
With the observed variations, fluctuations and even periods of consistency it is possible to immediately 
conjecture that scope exists to leverage this information for use in security. 
 
Figure 5. A single user's specific device observations 
Figure 5 above illustrates a histogram that has been compiled from observations of specific devices for a user 
throughout the duration of their fourteen day experimental participation. It shows the percentage of observations 
that recorded each of their fifteen RFID tags, cross-referenced to identify the specific devices or items of 
equipment. Clearly from this diagram, there is one personal item that was detected far more often than any other. 
The subject’s wallet was observed during approximately 45% of all recordings executed during the two week 
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experiment. So do inert devices or personal items provide greater security leverage than intelligent ones? For the 
same user, by plotting days’ observations in isolation (Figures 6 and 7) it is possible to examine more clearly 
how the user’s routine affects the devices that are detected. These diagrams illustrate the continuity of presence 
for each possession or item of equipment across the day, when contact is established and when it is lost. 
Additionally, other users’ devices are also shown (Other devices) indicating when they are also detected. 
Intuitively, these foreign device contacts mainly appear on the weekday plot (Figure 6) because the other 
members of the experimental group were all work colleagues but there is a single set of blips visible at 
approximately 16:15 at the weekend, suggesting that the subject briefly visited their work premises. 
 
Figure 6. A user’s isolated single weekday activity 
It is interesting to note that in both examples nearly the entire observation window from 6a.m. to 12p.m. has at 
least one device within detection range at any given moment. Indeed, closer examination appears to suggest that 
the inert devices are present most consistently throughout the day, supporting the potential for security leverage. 
 
Figure 7. The same user’s isolated single weekend day activity 
 
The discussion above has concentrated upon and examined the data from just a single user. It would require a 
study of many subjects to ascertain if this is unequivocally true or false, a volume of data that is not currently 
available. However within the current sample set high percentages of experimental detection are attributed to 
inert personal items when they were selected by an individual; indeed coats, work bags and hand bags all topped 
the frequency chart for particular participants. Clearly it cannot be stated that they provide a greater security 
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potential but equally it is important they should be utilised where possible because of their persistence and 
inconspicuous presence. 
CONFIDENCE 
Confidence of identity 
The concept of an Authentication Aura utilises confidence of the user’s identity in two ways. When a device is 
activated and the initial security check (if there is one) is passed, the confidence of the device in the user’s 
identity at that moment in time is high. The authentication has been passed and usually an implicit trust is made 
by the device in giving the user unrestricted access to the services and data it holds. This level of trust remains 
unwavering and unchallenged unless barriers such as a PIN protected screen saver/lock are implemented. Rather 
than continuing in this way the Aura concept erodes the user identity confidence over time; the longer it has been 
since an authentication was undertaken the lower the confidence will be. This degrading value will then be 
assessed and utilised to restrict some of the processes and applications available for use; eventually at a 
prescribed threshold unobtrusive re-authentication will be executed to reaffirm the user’s identity. It is of course 
rather simplistic to simply erode the confidence and so to counteract this effect the concept incorporates 
communicated authentication details from other trusted devices to positively boost the device’s identity 
confidence. Thus at a point in time the device has a confidence in the user’s identity that is a combination of time 
since last authentication, the authentication method used and information received from surrounding devices. 
The Aura concept’s calculation of user identity confidence is encapsulated by Equation 1. 
 
?? ? ?????? ???? ? ???????? ???
?
???
??
??? ?
??? ???
?
 
Equation 1. Formula for calculating a device's user identity confidence  
In the equation:   
 x signifies the user device on which the confidence C is being calculated. C is bounded within the range 0.0 
to 100.0 inclusively. 
 Function F1 calculates the amount of confidence using t the time since authentication was carried out on the 
given device (x) and m the authentication method that was used. 
 n represents the number of devices (both intelligent and dumb) that constitute the current Authentication 
Aura. 
 Function F2 yields the contribution to confidence that each Aura member (i = 1..n) makes to the receiving 
device x. Similarly to F1 this function utilises both time since authentication (t) and the method used (m) in 
its calculation. 
 
With confidence eroding and a re-authentication threshold in situ the influence of the surrounding Aura members 
will delay and even potentially postpone the need for the reaffirmation process to be undertaken. If the 
framework and process model are designed with an appropriate logical path, it may indeed be the case that initial 
activation authentication be by-passed because a suitably high level of confidence can be drawn from the 
surrounding trusted devices. 
It is appropriate to examine the potential of the confidence contribution to establish if there is sufficient evidence 
to progress this concept and hone the method by which function F2 might be invoked. 
Contribution from Aura members 
It is vital to establish or at least explore how the function (F2 in Equation 1) might be conceived and operate. 
Previous work has indicated that inherited confidence should be influenced by and adapt to location, the types of 
devices active within the Aura and the authentication methods they use (Hocking et al., 2010); these should thus 
be incorporated into the implemented function. To achieve this it is necessary to quantify scales of numeric 
values that can be implemented and then assessed to gauge performance. 
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As an initial first step, location can be allocated a simple tri-value range, home, work or other; equated to 3, 2 or 
1 respectively. Apportioning values in this way will enable a variation in confidence contribution to be 
accomplished. It is reasonable to argue that whilst at home devices should operate with less heightened security 
and be more relaxed about the way in which they are being used. Similarly at work, although assured the 
operating environment is less safe than within the owner’s home. Finally being away from both home and work 
is the time when a device should be most wary and inherit least confidence from surrounding pieces of 
equipment. Initially for assessment purposes this three point scale can be used as a simple multiplier resulting in 
inherited confidence at home being 50% more significant than that received from the same devices at work and 
three times more whilst in other unrecognised locations. 
In addition to location, it is imperative that the significance of the device is somehow incorporated into the 
contribution formula. As highlighted earlier in this paper some devices are more often detectable and less visible, 
a combination which arguably makes them of greater significance. With this being a mathematical calculation it 
seems sensible to allocate a ranking value (in the range 1..10) to each item of equipment owned by a user and 
use this within the formula, this will be referred to as the device’s rank. It is proposed that a rank of 1 should 
indicate the most significant pieces of equipment whilst 10 the least. This value can then be used as a divisor to 
reduce the relative contribution of each device. 
To establish the latent potential of drawing confidence from surrounding devices it is initially advantageous to 
keep the function as simple as possible. Therefore, although Equation 1 indicated that the specific confidence of 
any communicating device would be used currently a rigid maximum value will be set for each. To initiate 
investigation this will be fixed at 15%. In a fully operational model this would be allocated on a device by device 
basis and then reduced by the time that has elapsed since authentication and the method used.  
Thus the initial formula for F2 and the contribution made by device i becomes:- 
 
?? ? ?
??
??
? ?? ?? 
 
Equation 2. Formula for F2 to test the potential of confidence contribution made by each device 
Where …  
 i signifies the contributing device. 
 r is the significance rank of device i (in the range 1..10). 
 l is the location multiplier (in the range 1..3). 
Thus a device whose presence is regarded as being most significant (i.e. has a rank of 1) that is detected whilst 
the user is at home (location multiplier equal to 3) contributes 45% to the confidence of the host device. 
However, in the same location a device of medium significance (rank 5) would only contribute 9% and one of 
least significance (rank 10) just 4.5%. 
To aid in the clarity of this brief investigation a single day’s data for one user will be isolated and plotted so a 
subjective appraisal can be made. 
Table 2. Table of selected equipment and allocated rankings 
Equipment Rank  Equipment Rank  Equipment Rank 
Wallet 2  Car (Home) 3  Bag 4 
Fridge 4  Microscope 5  MP3 6 
Locker 6  Coat 4  PC 6 
Bed clock 4  Fax 9  Car (Work) 5 
Laptop (Work) 8  WiFi (Home) 5  Mobile (Work) 5 
The user chose to tag the fifteen items of equipment shown in the table above, enabling them to be detected 
during the experiment. The table also indicates the allocated ranking to each device. 
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Figure 8. Subjective rankings for a single day's data and the associated percentage contribution 
 
Introducing the subjective rankings (as shown in Table 2) to the data has the effect of yielding the cumulative 
percentage contribution plot shown in Figure 8. The most significant devices and those set with the lowest rank 
were the subject's home appliances, bag, personal car and mobile phone, whilst the remaining gadgets and 
possessions were set with mid to high range values. Although this allocation is subjective it is based on the 
premise that the higher ranking objects should be those that are personal or large and immoveable, providing less 
obvious security enforcement. For instance, the user’s wallet is the highest ranking device (2), closely followed 
by their personal car, bag, fridge and coat. Applying these ranking values to the devices and employing the 
user’s location, the cumulative percentage contribution for the observed items, at each given point in time, was 
calculated and then plotted against the associated time of day. This allocation of rankings appears to deliver a 
good spread of contribution percentages, reflecting the environment and highlighting the potential of this 
approach to deliver security enhancement. Without any degradation of confidence occurring on the 
communicating devices the percentage contribution tops out at nearly 90%, a far greater figure than would 
normally be observed. Although abnormally high this value further supports the argument that it may indeed be 
possible in certain circumstances for newly activated devices to avoid having to perform a sequence of 
authentication at all; the communicated confidence in the user's identity being sufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
An investigation into inherited confidence has demonstrated that there is indeed scope for such a methodology to 
positively contribute toward this alternative approach to device security. Although the assessment of confidence 
contribution was founded on simplistic algorithms the findings confirmed the latent potential of this method. 
Extroverted awareness of surroundings and other objects can be positively leveraged both unilaterally and within 
a cooperative set of devices. Surprisingly perhaps some of the greatest security reassurance can be drawn from 
inert possessions that we might not readily expect, especially those that are not immediately visible but are 
carried on a daily basis. 
Utilising these findings as ground work for the next stage of investigation it is now possible to develop a 
working prototype based upon the concepts outlined in this paper. Functioning agent software can now be 
written and tested to further establish the practicality of this method and if there are restrictions that are currently 
unforeseen. 
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